The Indo-US Nuke Deal is History, How About an Indo-Pak Kashmir Deal?

The Indo-US Nuke Deal is History, How About an Indo-Pak Kashmir Deal?

Ganga Prasad G. Rao
http://myprofile.cos.com/gangar


Now that the nuke deal is done, may we breathe again? That would be like Dr. Manmohan Singh playing the fiddle with Kashmir burning. There are many who would agree that we had our priorities wrong in dealing first with the US while the Dal lake (and lately, our metropolises) turned crimson with blood from planned mayhem. The Kashmir problem has proved a curse for India over the decades since Independence. Despite two wars, loss of thousands of civilians and military personnel, and billions in various aid packages, Kashmir continues to be a proverbial thorn in the flesh for India and Pakistan, costing both nations a significant proportion of the GDP in mis-allocated resources and lost economic opportunities. The problem which was barely regional in dimension, has festered in to a geopolitical crisis with ramifications both for internal security, and for international relations with China, US and nuclear treaties (not to mention the ever-elusive 'peace dividend'!). The present policy of military policing of Kashmiri civilians and a focus on cross-border terrorism has been a resounding failure. Political declarations of success notwithstanding, bilateral accords, including the Simla pact, typically lasted at most through the end of the government term. Their unpopularity was revealed both by the defeat of the leaders at the polls and frequent riots, rebellion, terrorist activity and the like that have been engendered since inking the pact. So what are our options? A 'laissez faire' policy can only mean more of the same: more infiltration, more terrorist attacks, more 'Kargils', more bombing in city centers and markets, and rivers of wasted resources tinged with the blood of our brave jawans, Kashmiris and civilians across the length and breadth of our nation – a terrifying prospect and a future we simply cannot accept for our children. Time indeed for an 'out of the box' solution.

The Kashmir issue could be conceptualized as the re-assertion of territorial rights by the historically majority religious community who seek to translate that in to sovereignty from India. In this regard, it has the explicit support of Pakistan which has supported an independent Kashmir despite holding on to POK, an integral part of a Kashmir solution. India, on the other hand, seeks to enforce its interpretation of property rights as followed from the acquisition of J&K from the royals who ruled prior to Independence from the British. These differing views of territorial (religious and majority) rights are being enforced to extents dictated by military might, political necessities, besides religious and majority might. Frankly speaking, I have never been too kind to any one side in the Kashmir tangle. Despite all our military prowess and defence purchases, Kashmir will never be resolved militarily. I believe each party to the strife can and should be more accommodative of the views of other stakeholders. And, given the circumstances, a compromise is both necessary and the only feasible solution. But where is the elusive 'think out of the box' compromise?

There are four cornerstones to the 'Rao Compromise on Kashmir': a stable peaceful and democratic Kashmir, the avoiding of partition-type violence and mass-displacement of minorities, a participative legislative role for both India and Pakistan, and an overriding military role for international organizations. Under an UN-sponsored 'Statehood dialogue', India and Pakistan would sponsor a Greater Kashmir comprising of both the Indian Kashmir and the POK. Citizens would be offered dual citizenship, either Kashmiri and Indian, or Kashmiri and Pakistani, with restricted rights of movements in India and Pakistan respectively. A proportional representation constitution would be framed with a tri-cameral house. A third of the seats would be allotted to UN representatives and other international political and military organizations on a 'nomination basis', thus offering them a political, (budgetary) and military stake in the state. India and Pakistan would together control a third of the seats, again on a nomination basis. Both nations would be free to choose representatives from within or outside their part of Kashmir. The exact split between India and Pakistan in the combined one-third share of the House would depend on how much they would be willing to offer to Greater Kashmir in terms of budgetary support. Kashmiris would elect representatives for a third of the assembly seats. Political parties would then seek a majority to form the government by approaching Indian and/or Pakistani benches and minorities. The government would control various ministries and the Police, while the UN would take over the military function of the state, securing its borders and facilitating orderly cross-border flow of goods and people. Given the tri-cameral and sponsored nature of the House, different sections of the House would have different voting rights depending on context and scope. Certain decisions regarding changes to constitution, property rights, religious rights, territorial integrity, and minority rights would require at least a four-fifth majority in the House, and in particular the endorsement of the UN, thus enforcing the wishes of the sponsor nations and the will of the international community on those critical matters.

Despite its seeming frivolousness, this 'rabbit out of the hat' solution is likely a superior compromise because it provides a 'meet you half-way' solution between traditional enemies. It affords Kashmiris a much greater degree of territorial rights and self-governance than under a divided Kashmir. A restricted system of dual citizenship offers Kashmiris the opportunity to integrate with the people of their choice; it ensures the safety of minority citizens on either side of the LOC and pre-empts partition-type mass displacement and strife. The compromise proposal offers India and Pakistan an opportunity to shape the destiny of a Greater Kashmir by offering them a legal means to participate in the formation of the state and its governance. Sponsoring the state of Greater Kashmir will reduce tensions and defence expenditures, enabling both nations to divert scarce resources away to more productive ends that enhance the quality of life of its citizens. Reduction in geopolitical tension will reduce terrorism, improve business climate and in turn pave the way for enhanced foreign investment and overall prosperity. Unlike other solutions where they are often relegated to a peace-keeping role that drains resources and inflicts personnel losses, the UN, in this proposal, has a political role beyond its traditional commitments to international peace-keeping. This offers the international community a direct stake in securing regional peace and enhances the credibility of the solution.

Got a better idea?