An Optimally-Weighted Issue-Based Tradeable Vote-Point Election System

An Optimally-Weighted Issue-Based Tradeable Vote-Point Election System

Ganga Prasad G. Rao
http://myprofile.cos.com/gangar

Earlier, I broached how one could bring about a self-selected and optimally-weighted voting in an election by requiring voters to pay for the privilege of voting and providing them with vote points based on their issue-knowledge demonstrated to the computer in a questionnaire. Now consider a radically different system of people's representation based on vote points and issue-based ballots. Parliamentary representatives are elected by citizens who pay voting fees and allocate their vote points across competing candidates. The winner at the polls takes his seat in the Parliament. However, unlike the democracy we have, losing candidates do not hibernate in political oblivion if and until the next election beckon them. Instead, they serve as the keepers of vote points in annual issue ballots for those who did not vote for the Parliamentary winner. In other words, losers continue to play an important role in national policies, albeit from outside the Parliament. How? Read on.

Suppose issue ballots are held annually for the term of the Parliament. There are k candidates (one winner to the Parliament and k-1 losing candidates) from each constituency. Each candidate lists his or her issue priority. Let voters be provided up to xn points on paying their vote fees and answering an annual issue questionnaire. Voters allocate their earned vote points across issues, weighting them per their preferences ('issue salience'). This determines the importance of issues as perceived by citizens and provides the basis for the government/parties to prioritize issues to take up during a Parliamentary session. Next, voters assign vote points within an issue to one or more candidates in the fray, this time weighting them on the basis of candidate positions on those issues. (ie, they fill a matrix in which each cell represent vote points assigned to a candidate on a particular issue) Thus, candidates obtain different number of vote points on different issues. Candidate A (perhaps the Parliamentary representative) garners most votes on issues a, c and e, Candidate B scores in issues b and d, and so on. When the issue comes up for vote (on the basis of vote points) in the Parliament, alliances will be formed and there will be a demand for vote points (especially if a 2/3rd or 3/4th affirmative votes are required to enact on the issue. Incidentally, the degree of majority required to win an issue is a measure of the concern for the minority/opposition/losers. Typically, richer the nation, the more is the concern for the minority. A welfare state may require 90% affirmative vote points). Different parties will then seek the vote points vested with different representatives (and losing candidates) on the various issues before the Parliament. Those Parliamentary representatives whose prioritize did not match voter priorities or, in any case, did not score well in issue ballots may need to return to their constituency and negotiate with their poll opponents for vote-points. Thus, the concept of tradeable vote points is born. Representatives may trade vote points vested by voters with losing candidates in issue ballots (vote points are not transferable across issues) in exchange for monetary or non-monetary favors in an open, legal framework until the stipulated majority threshold is achieved. When those favors are collectively or indivisibly passed on to constituents, the scheme could be loosely interpreted as a pareto-optimal trade or 'compensation' in matters involving costs and benefits. For example, in the matter of river water sharing or dams, a 90% majority can only be obtained by buying out the opposition (who happen to represent the poor opposed to the project) which could be construed as compensation for the costs imposed on them. Further, the price of the vote points would depend on the vote-point strength and positions of the promoters and opponents of the project and how far the proposal is from the median preferences represented by voters. Thus, an ultra-right proposal in a centrist society would exact a high price in the form of a higher price for vote points. The high price on vote points would prod those behind the proposal to move left until a point is reached where the marginal condition (equating the benefits of moving the party's policy position against the price of vote-points) is fulfilled.


This system has many attributes to commend it. It permits voters to self-select issues of importance to them. The post-election tabulation of vote points provides politicians a measure of both the knowledge and priorities of voters, enabling them in turn to prioritize issues for parliamentary attention (presuming a knowledge-based society). It ensures that a particular Parliamentary representative does not claim the right to decide on all issues, including those on which he has no expertise or on which his position does not match those of his voters. It facilitates issue-based voting as opposed to party- or candidate-based voting. It permits differentiation in position on issues and forces citizens to consider pros and cons of various positions. Further, losing candidates retain an important role, as 'vote point banks' in policy matters post-election. It provides a theoretical and legal basis for political 'horse trading' that were hitherto banned, implicit, or underhanded. And more!

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