Public Funding of the Election Dance – Try the ‘Rao Twist’ !

Public Funding of the Election Dance? Try the ‘Rao Twist’ !

Ganga Prasad G. Rao
http://myprofile.cos.com/gangar


We may be between elections, but corruption is a perennial river - a river with many sources, one dirtier than the other, each seeking the rainbow, and, both the setting sun on the horizon and the rising moon as the serpentine merges in to the confluence of the sky and the sea. Elections, doubtless, are one of the largest of these corruption sources; the reason being that a change in government brings about changes in policy that affect large domestic business houses, VHNIs, and foreign industries, beyond impacting, in a fundamental way, the multitudes invested in stock markets and fixed assets. The consequent large shadow values attached to electoral results is the motivation behind many-a-backroom pre-election moves. Practically, every one of these moves is an underhand deal with payoffs arranged in one of the many discrete and not-so-discrete ways. So, what can we, as Anna Hazare faithfuls, do, to correct this corruption curse, a monstrosity that visits upon us every few years (and sometimes is the reason for the premature change in government?) Yes, we could adopt PR at the ballot box, but that does not get to corruption. Are we then to turn, either meek witnesses to the rape of our constitution and the loot of public wealth, or, God forbid, storm the Parliament, to impose our will? Thankfully, No.

Let us, instead, consider an ‘overground system’ for the funding of elections. Political parties are aware of and exploit voting blocs among the masses – Employees-HomeOwners-Investors, Businesses-Producers-Capitalists, Voters-Subsidy Recipients-Consumers, Retirees-Pensioners, Farmers, Environmentalists, Religious Groups (if constitutionally permitted), to name a few. Presume that a mechanism can be created to channel a small percent, say 0.1 %, from the financial transactions of each citizen/business entity/organization in to one or more of the public Voting Bloc funds. These Voting Bloc Funds would be overseen by the CEC (perhaps a triumvirate of officers for each voting bloc deputed by the CVC to the CEC). Upon the announcement of elections, these Voting Blocs announce auction-based funding rounds. Funds are offered on a per-contested-seat basis, albeit with a lien. The lien is removed post election results when a certain fraction (‘take back’) is held back depending on the party’s electoral performance. This ‘take back’ fraction is bidded upon in online auctions in successive funding rounds across all voting blocs. Thus, a 90% take-back round is announced for all voting blocs simultaneously, and parties willing to ‘give back’ 90% for every loss may approach one or more of the voting blocs for funds. This is followed by a 80% take-back round, then 70%, and so on, until the officers declare the funding rounds closed. The CEC would, at the conclusion of the elections, publish consolidated accounts that reconcile liens and ‘take backs’ from each party. This mechanism ensures, on one hand, that only the politically viable parties approach the voting blocs first, and on the other, guarantees propriety in party electoral expenses, which otherwise would tend to inflate with freely available public funds in a competitive election arena involving parties that must outspend each other to catch the voter’s attention.

Voters, who previously had little clout, now have an organized, legal, even a public channel to pursue their agenda. Each voter would have indicated, online, his choice of voting bloc for the channeling of his contributions. Conceivably, each voter could opt to channel his contributions, cumulated and apportioned annually, to one or more of the (overlapping) voting blocs (a consumer is also a ‘green’, an investor and a retiree). At the ballot box, voters evaluate each party’s manifesto, its funding sources, and the compatibility of their manifesto with that of funding sources, and with one’s own preferences and opinions on various issues of national importance, and societal/personal interest.

Parties, which previously resorted to large scale corruption to fund their campaign, or that approached large business houses and those unnamed foreign sources for electoral funding, now turn to public funding sources. They cast their manifesto and choose candidates to maximize some joint function of electoral success and (retained/net) electoral funding from public sources. Clearly, the availability of legal and public source of electoral funding reduces the incentive to seek out ‘high-risk’ and illegal electoral funding sources whose patrons exact their pound of flesh upon the nation, its citizens, and its future. The overt nature of funding and transparency of the electoral process also contributes to a less-corrupt electoral process, and in turn, to a more upright Parliament and Government.

Bottom line, a less-corrupt, more efficient, and a more equitable society. Not a bad way to fight corruption, huh?

Wanna vote on my proposal?

(Comments and Suggestions? Direct them to the CEC and the CVC !)